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$\Gamma$ 6 $(K, P, U, C,p, h)$ $0$
:
$K=(V, E)$ ; the game (finite) tree ( $Z(\subset V)$ ; the set of endpoints, $0$ ; origin)
$P=(P_{\dot{l}};i\in N)$ ; the player partition $(of X=V-Z)$
$(N=\{0,1, \cdots, n\})$ the set of players, where $0$ is the nature player)
$U=(U_{i};i\in N)$ ; the information partition
$C=(C_{u};u\in U)$ ; the choice partition
$p=(p_{u}(c);c\in C_{u}, u\in U_{0})$ ; the completely mixed probability assignment
$h=(h_{i})_{i\in N)}Zarrow R^{n}$ ; the payoff function
perfect recall
2. 2
$\Gamma$ perfect recall $u,$ $v\in U_{i},$ $i\in N$ $c\sim y$
(i.e. $y$ comes after c) $c\in C_{u}$ $y\in v$ $x’\in v$
$c\sim x$
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”players) decision $tree$” $[4]$
Kuhn[5] Selten[12] behavior strategies
Player $i(\in N-\{0\})$
$\pi_{\iota}=(\pi_{iu};u\in U_{i})\in\Pi_{i}=\otimes_{u\in U_{i}}C_{u}$ ; the set of pure strategies of player $i$
$b_{i}=(b_{\uparrow u};u\in U_{\iota})\in B_{i}=\otimes_{u\in U_{i}}D(C_{u})$ ; the set of behavior strategies of player $i$
$q_{\iota}=(q_{\dot{l}}(\pi_{\iota});\pi_{\iota}\in\Pi_{\iota})\in Q_{\iota}=D(\Pi_{i})$ ; the set of mixed strategies of player $i$
$D(X)$ ;the set of discrete probability distributions on $X$ $B_{l}$
$Q_{i}$
$s_{i}=(s_{\dot{\iota}}(b_{i});b_{i}\in B_{i})\in S_{i}=\{s_{\dot{l}}\in D(B_{\dot{l}});\{b_{\dot{\iota}}\in B_{\dot{\iota}};s_{i}(b_{\iota})>0\}$ is finite $\}$ ; the set of
behavior strategy mixtures of player $i$
2. 3
$t_{i}^{1},$ $t_{\dot{l}}^{2}(\in S$ $s_{-l}\cdot\in\otimes_{J}\neq lS_{J}$ $x\in V$ $\rho(x, (t_{i}^{1}, s_{-\iota}))=\rho(x, (t_{l}^{2}, s_{-\iota}))$
$t_{\iota}!\sim t_{\dot{l}}^{2}$ (realization equivalence)
$\rho(x, s)$ $s\in\otimes_{\iota\in N}$ $x$
$s\in\otimes_{i\in N}S_{i},$ $x\in u\in[\prime_{i};p(- x, s)>0,$ $e=(x, y)\in c\in C_{u}$ conditional
choice probability $\mu(c, x, s)=\rho(y)s)/\rho(x, s)$
(Kuhn [5], Selten[12])
(1) $-$ (3) :
(1 )perfect recall
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(2) $s_{i}\in S_{i)}i\in N$ $s_{\dot{\iota}}\sim b_{\iota}$ $b_{\dot{\iota}}\in B_{\iota}$
(3) $q_{\iota}\in Q_{\iota},$ $i\in N$ $q_{-\dot{\iota}}\in\otimes_{g\neq\iota}Q$
)
$h(b_{\uparrow},$ $q_{-\iota})=h(q_{\dot{\iota}},$ $q_{-\uparrow})$
(payoff equivalent) $b_{\iota}\in B_{\iota}$




behavior strategies realization equivalence perfect recall
3. 1
$b_{l}!,$ $b_{l}^{2}\in B_{i}$ $b_{\iota}^{1}\sim b_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}$ $u\in U_{\iota};b_{?}^{1}(u)\neq$
$b_{i}^{2}$ ( $c\sim u$ $b_{l}!(v)(c)=b_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}(v)(c)=0$ $c\in C_{\text{ }},$ $v\in U_{\dot{\iota}}$
( ) $b_{-i}\in\otimes r\neq\iota B_{)}$ completely mixed (i.e. $j\in N-$
$\{0, i\},$ $u\in U_{J},$ $c\in C_{u}$ $b_{\dot{\iota}u}(c)>0$ ) $x\in u\in U_{\iota};b_{l}!(u)\neq b_{\uparrow}^{2}(u)$
( )
$b_{l}!(u)(c)>b_{\dot{l}}^{2}(u)(c)$ $c\in C_{u}$ $a\sim u$
$v\in U_{l}\cdot,$ $a\in C_{v}$ $b_{l}^{i}(v)(a)=b_{l}^{2}(v)(a)>0$ $\rho(x,$ $(bl!,$ $b_{-\dot{\iota}}))=$
$p(x, (b_{\dot{l}}^{2}, b_{-i}))>0$ $e=(x, y)\in c$ $\rho(y, (b\iota!, b_{-\iota}))>\rho(y, (b_{l}^{2}, b_{-i}))$
$b_{i}^{1}\sim b_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}$
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$b_{l}!(u)(c)\neq b_{i}^{2}(u)(c)$ $c\in C_{u},$ $u\in$ path ; $0arrow z$
$\rho(z, (bl!, b_{-i}))=\rho(z, (b_{i}^{2}, b_{-i}))=0$
realization equivalence mixed strategies 3 . 1
pure strategies realization equivalence
3. 2
$\pi_{i}^{1},$ $\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}\in$ $\pi_{\iota}!\sim\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}$ $u\in U_{i};\pi_{l}!_{u}\neq\pi_{\dot{\iota}u}^{2}$
$c\sim u$ $\pi_{\iota}!_{v}\neq c$ and $\pi_{\dot{\iota}v}^{2}\neq c$ $c\in C_{v},$ $v\in$
realization equivalence pure strategies
$\Pi_{\dot{l}}^{0}=\Pi_{i}/\sim$ mixed strategies $\Pi_{\dot{l}}^{0}$ mixed
strategies $Q_{l}^{0}=D(\Pi_{\dot{l}}^{0})$
7
$U_{\dot{\iota}}$ (information trees) mixed strategies
realization equivalence
$\pi_{l}!,$ $\pi_{l}^{2}\in$ $\Pi$ $\pi_{l}!\sim$ 3. 2 $\pi_{\iota}!_{u}\neq\pi_{\dot{x}u}^{2}$
$\pi_{i}^{1},$ $\pi_{i}^{2}$ completely mixed (i.e. $j(\in N-\{0, i\})$
choice conditional choice probability )
$q_{-\dot{\iota}}\in\otimes_{g\neq\dot{\iota}}Q_{J}$ $x\in u\in$ $0$ perfect recall
$U$,







( ) $q_{-\dot{\iota}}\in\otimes_{g\neq i}Q_{\gamma}$ completely mixed $U_{i}$ $K$
$U_{i}$
$u$ $i$
$x$ choice $\pi_{l}!,$ $\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}$ $u$
$u$ $z\in Z$ $x_{1}\sim z$ $x_{1}\in u$
$\rho(x_{1}, (\mu_{i}^{1}*(1/2)+\mu_{i}^{2}*(1/2), q_{-i}))=\rho(x_{1}, (\pi_{l}!*(1/2)+\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}*(1/2), q_{-i}))Ba$ $\mu(z,$ $x_{1},$ $(\mu_{l}^{i}*$
$($ 1/2 $)$ $+\mu_{i}^{2}*(1/2),$ $q_{-i}))=\mu(z,$ $x_{1},$ $(\pi_{l}!*(1/2)+\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}*(1/2),$ $q_{-i}))$ $p(z,$ $(\mu_{l}!*(1/2)$
$\mu_{\dot{l}}^{2}*(1/2),$ $q_{-i}))=\rho(z,$ $(\pi_{i}^{1}*(1/2)+\pi_{i}^{2}*(1/2),$ $q_{-\iota}))$ $z\in Z$
$\rho(z, (\mu_{l}!*(1/2)+\mu_{\dot{l}}^{2}*(1/2), q_{-i}))=\rho(z, (\pi_{l}!*(1/2)+\pi_{i}^{2}*(1/2), q_{-i}))$
$\mu_{l}!,$ $\mu_{\dot{l}}^{2}$
$\pi_{l}!,$ $\pi_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}\in\Pi_{l}^{0}$ $\pi_{l}!\neq\pi_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}$ $\mu_{l}!=\pi_{l}!,$ $\mu_{\dot{l}}^{2}=\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}$
$\mu_{l}!=\pi_{l}^{2},$ $\mu_{\dot{l}}^{2}=$ $u$ $i$
$\pi_{l}!=\pi_{l}^{2}$
realization equivalence realization equivalence
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3. 4
$q_{l}!,$ $q_{\dot{l}}^{2},$ $r_{l}!,$ $r_{\dot{l}}^{2}\in Q$ $q_{l}!\sim q_{\dot{l}}^{2}$ $\sim r_{\dot{l}}^{2}$ $0\leq p\leq 1$
$q_{\iota}^{1}*p+r_{l}^{1}*(1-p)\sim q_{?}^{2}*p+r_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}*(1-p)$
$q_{l}!\sim q^{2}$ $r_{l}!\sim r_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}$ $q_{\iota}!,$ $q_{\iota}^{2},$ $r_{l}^{1},$ $r_{\iota}^{2}\in Q_{i}$ $s_{l}^{1},$ $s_{l}^{2}$ $0<p<1$
$q_{\iota}!!!$
mixed strategies realization equivalence 3 . 2
3 . 3 2 mixed strategies realization equivalence
3. 5
$U_{i}\vee\llcorner$ $K$ $[\prime_{\dot{\iota}}$
mixed strategies realization equivalence 3.
2 3 . 3 3 . 4 realization equivalence
( ) $q_{\iota}!,$ $q_{\dot{l}}^{2}\in Q_{i}^{0}$ $q_{l}!\sim q_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}$ $q_{-\dot{\iota}}\in\otimes_{2}\neq\dot{\iota}Q_{J}$ completely mixed
$\rho(z, (q_{i}^{1}, q_{-i}))=\rho(z, (q_{l}^{2}, q_{-i}))>0$ $z\in Z$ $\rho(z, (\pi_{\dot{\iota}}, q_{-\iota}))>0$
$q_{i}^{1}(\pi_{i})<q_{\dot{l}}^{2}(\pi_{i})$ $\in\Pi_{i}^{0}$ $\rho(z, (\pi_{l}!, q_{-i}))>$
$0,$ $\cdots,$




$U_{\dot{l}}$ $p(x, (\pi_{i)}q_{-\iota}))>0$ $x$ $J=$
$\{j\in\{1, \cdots, k\}|\pi_{\dot{\iota}c\iota}^{j}\neq\pi_{iu}\}\neq\phi$ $v,$ $\in$
3 . 3 3 . 4 realization equivalence $p(z,$ $(\mu_{l}!,$ $q_{-i}))=$
. . . $=p(z, (\mu_{i}^{l}, q_{-i}))=0,$ $\Sigma r\in Jq_{l}!(d_{i})=q_{l}!(\mu_{l}!)+\cdots+q_{l}!(\mu:)$ $j=1,$ $\cdots,$ $l$
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$\rho(\prime x, (\mu_{\dot{\iota})}^{J}q_{-\iota}))>0,$ $\mu_{\dot{\iota}u}^{J}=\pi_{lu}$ $\mu_{\iota}\cdot\cdot\mu!,\cdot,:\in\Pi_{l}^{0}$ $q_{l}!(\pi_{\dot{\iota}}^{J})$ $q_{\iota}!(\mu_{\dot{l}}^{J})$
$\pi_{\dot{l}}^{j}$ $\mu_{t}^{J}$ $u$ choice $0$ realization eq$\iota iiva$.lent
$q_{?}^{1}$ realization equivalent rmxed strategy $q_{l}!$
$q_{l}!\sim q_{\dot{l}}^{2}$ $q_{l}^{1}(\pi_{\iota})=q_{\dot{\iota}}^{2}(\pi_{i})$ 3. 4 $q_{l}!\sim q_{\dot{l}}^{2}$
$p(z, (q_{\iota}^{1}, q_{-\dot{\iota}}))=p(z, (q_{\dot{l}}^{2}, q_{-\iota}))=0$ $q_{\iota}^{1},$ $q_{?}^{\underline{9}}$
$Z$ realization equivalent
\S 4
pure strategies agreement equivalence ( payoff equivalence)
(PRNF or Reduced normal form[3] ) $(S=\otimes_{\dot{\iota}\in N}S_{\uparrow}, \pi=(\pi_{i};i\in N))$
Mailah et al.[6] ( )
4. 1
X $=X_{\dot{l}}\otimes X_{-?}\subset S_{\iota}\otimes(\otimes_{y\neq\iota}S_{\gamma})$ $i\in N$ $r_{\iota},$ $s_{\uparrow}\in X_{i}$
$x_{-i}\in X_{-\tau}$ $\pi(t_{\uparrow}, x_{-\iota})=\pi(r_{i}, x_{-i})$ $x_{-\iota}\in(\otimes_{j}\neq?S_{I})-X_{-\iota}$
$\pi$ $($ $, x_{-\dot{\iota}})=\pi(s_{\dot{\iota}}, x_{-i})$ $t_{i}\in X_{\dot{l}}$
perfect recall
3. 3 $\pi_{l}!,$ $\pi_{\dot{l}}^{2}$
( ) $\mu_{\uparrow}^{1},$ $\mu_{7}^{2}$, realization equivalence
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